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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Sharp cutbacks in federal aid for housing and community development now
challenge Boston to become more resourceful in its housing strategies. In the
neighborhoods where new solutions are needed, much has already been happening
that can be adapted and expanded.
Fortunately, the City's resurgence can also
help achieve more results with less public resources, but a fresh approach
involving community interests is essential. At the same time, local laws,
procedures and programs devised to address past problems must also be
critically re-evaluated to determine their appropriateness to the new
realities.

Confidence in Boston's future is being uplifted, and many neighborhoods
have come to experience new housing demand, even where deterioration and
abandonment still persist. The new challenge is to harness this demand, tap
latent community resources, and confront housing problems on a neighborhood
basis, working at the margins with private and community interests, rather
than simply creating a costly but limited number of rental units for
disadvantaged residents, consuming all the available assistance in a few
showcase developments, low-income "Cadillac" housing.

Affordability has emerged as today's dominant housing issue, as the
multi-faceted, persistent housing "crisis" has evolved over the last twenty
However, thousands of abandoned dwellings and empty public housing
years.
remain;
units
there are more homeless than were ever recognized before; and
many more thousands of small scale properties, containing 2 to 6 units, are in
tax arrears.
Financial approaches dominated during the 1970s, as large amounts of
federal urban renewal, community development and housing dollars flowed to
Boston.
Assisted rental developments replaced private construction; then as
the emphasis shifted towards rehabilitation, costs rose from around $11,000 in
1970 to as much as $90,000 per unit in 1983 for modernizing uninhabitable
public housing.
The Great Society commitment to produce affordable rental housing
expanded from a limited number of categorical federal programs into a mindboggling maze involving more tools, more agencies and levels of government,
and much more time, as it became necessary to piggy-back subsidy upon subsidy
to achieve visible results.
The Boston Housing Partnership and Linkage, the
symbolic tithe on downtown developers, are but the latest steps in this
progression so ill-suited to the 1980s.

Perceptions have played a critical role along the way, focussing public
attention on such issues as red-lining, disinvestment, speculation, arson,
gentrification, and displacement. Meanwhile, compared to suburban prices,
Boston values are still a bargain. Actual private housing costs, both in home
prices and rents, lagged inflation for years.
Recently however, they have
begun to compensate for inflation. Affordability has therefore become the
timely issue as rental housing at 1970s prices vanishes.

-
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Since people do not shop for housing as regularly as for groceries, the
dramatic price changes confront them only when they move, making things seem
even more critical.
A household moving today must suddenly pay considerably
more, and its outcry makes everyone think there is a housing shortage, when in
fact vacancy levels in habitable housing are normal.
However,
finding an
affordable dwelling does seem difficult when for years one could move on to
the next hand-me-down, and pay little more than before.
Now, newcomers have
become interested in such properties. This may mean a neighborhood is
improving, but housing costs will continue to rise, especially for those who
move about.

Boosting neighborhood confidence through home improvement incentives
stimulated much fix-up of resident-owned properties during the 1970s. Now the
more difficult properties remain: absentee-owned 3-10 unit structures.
Nevertheless, tackled directly, a public subsidy to write down $5,000 per unit
but a fraction of the $75,000 required for each unit of public housing
modernization
will refurbish any but the most rotted, gutted shell.
Appropriately administered, public outlays can recondition many more units in
the private stock and boost neighborhood confidence as well.
Parts of
Dorchester and Jamaica Plain have already been "bootstrapping" themselves in
this way.

—

—

Increasing the capacity of community groups and residents to fix-up past
neglect will take time, however. Many interveners, yearning for quicker
will seek to continue the familiar but increasingly inappropriate
results,
federal low income rental housing model, piggy-backing multiple subsidies,
while ignoring fresh approaches to neighborhood revitalization that can both
harness Eoston's renewed vitality, as well as achieve more with less.

This paper identifies new approaches which operate principally at the
neighborhood level, linking with both private and community resources to make
the most of the available public assistance.
Instead of producing units
through financial wizardry, this approach seeks to simplify the system and
harness the City's resurgence without taxing it.

Viewed from the traditional perspective, Boston's housing situation
appears "very challenging." Community Development Block Grants for the
If it
current Year IX amount to $22 million, but this only sounds like a lot.
were directly turned into $50,000 dwellings, mortgages, or whatever, only 440
units would result, helping only a fraction of one percent of Boston's 220,000
For
households. Furthermore, much of this $22 million is already earmarked.
example, this year, only $12.5 million were committed towards housing
services, and over a quarter of that, $3.4 million, went to the Boston Housing
Authority, towards Modernization and Security.
The recently devised Linkage concept has been prematurely heralded as a
substantial new source of funds. Drawing a modest stream of resources from
major new private developments, it promises an estimated $37-52 million over
Since it will take
the next ten years in new money dedicated toward housing.
can
count
on
no more than $3time for this flow to become established, Boston
5 million annually from Linkage, as currently proposed.
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A total housing budget of some $16 million annually is what the
traditional housing planners will have available in coming years. Their
choices, in elementary terms, are:
o
Help
400 houses with $40,000 per unit?
o
Help 1,600 houses with $10,000 per unit?
o
Help 16,000 houses with $1,000 per unit?
Even 16,000 households are well under 8 percent of Boston's households,
and several times that number, more than 20 percent of its residents were in
"poverty status" in 1980. Furthermore, what can one do today with $1000 to
make a lasting improvement?

One thing is clear. The stock surplus of the 1960s and 70s which kept
rents down is gone. Henceforth, renting will actually cost more than owning.
Shortages will rapidly raise values. Residents can acquire title to their
units and share in rising equities, or let others reap the windfalls
and
then displace them.
Rent controls offer only false protection.

—

New and more appropriate responses are possible, however, due to the
changed realities. The important consideration is whether new initiatives
that work indirectly are acceptable, ones leveraging more community effort and
private resources.
If that drawback can be accepted, at least in applying the
bulk of the scarce housing resources, then much more becomes possible:
•

"Thaw" the inventory of more than ten thousand properties in tax
arrears, by forgiving taxes that are unlikely ever to be paid.
Convey them to new resident owners and non-profit housing
sponsors, expanding the Land Bank model.

•

Redirect new housing demand entering Boston s neighborhoods, towards
the substandard stock so that private interests do more of the
reconditioning. This involves both making weaker neighborhoods more
attractive and allowing accessory apartments to be created where
demand is strong.

•

Weatherize housing stock occupied by long term lower income
residents with outright grants to owners, recapturable upon sale.
This not only creates many new local jobs, but will also discourage
sales, thereby averting significant increases in future housing
costs.
Less than $800 per unit can achieve substantial energy
savings
and every 45 units adds a lower skilled job to the local
economy.
It also pays back in fuel savings in less than four years.

1

—

•

Help residents to buy their dwellings (possibly with tax exempt
mortgage assistance, public write-downs, or the promised 1984
federal tax credit certificates) before regional shortages further
raise existing home values. Much of Boston's existing stock is
worth twice its current market price, if residents could maintain it
and meet its operating costs.
Were the City to provide the tools
and training suggested in this paper, residents would capture this
rise in home equity for themselves and develop more pride in their
communities at the same time.

-

II.
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PROBLEMS AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES

Efforts to attain these new housing goals run up against four serious
constraints:

1)

demand/supply imbalances,

community groups,

2)

unsophisticated owners and

3) an income/expense gap unbridgeable with the subsidies

available, and 4) a host of existing laws, regulations and excessively

complex assistance procedures that indirectly discourage improvements.

A.

The Four Challenges

1.

Demand/Supply Imbalances

.

Wherever effective demand is either too

weak or too strong, this destabilizes neighborhoods, and if the underlying

market imbalances are not resolved, efforts directed only at obvious
symptoms like deteriorated conditions will prove futile.

Where demand

remains too weak, deterioration will continue; where it stays too strong,
prices will soar; both threaten the ability of residents to remain.

New rental construction on vacant lots was a very counter-productive past
strategy.

It not only cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per parcel, but

it drew the remaining demand into the new developments, while making their

surroundings appear shabbier.

This further imbalanced local markets.

Today, these developments still soak up disproportionate subsidies to avert

their foreclosure.

Improving only abandoned structures with public

subsidies, the subsequent policy, was also inadequate to revitalize

neighborhoods.
Today, regional housing shortages and swelling demands are rapidly

changing neighborhood markets.

Rent controls would seem an obvious answer,

but experience in "hot" markets like San Francisco teaches that such efforts
to protect prior tenants can backfire into arson and traumatic displacement.

Boston's primary challenge now is to understand and find new ways to
deal with the underlying mismatches between demand and supply, neighborhood
by neighborhood.

Now that overall housing demand is improving,

this

involves redirecting housing demand from areas where it is too strong
towards others where blighting 3-10 unit properties currently still hold

back demand.
2.

This is like "orchestrating musical chairs."

Unsophisticated Owners, Residents, and Community Groups

.

Since

many residents in the weaker market areas were unable to afford decent
housing, dysfunctional "survival techniques" sprang up, such as skipping out
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on rent obligations, not paying taxes, and exploiting available laws and

Many shrewd owners sold their properties early to the

assistance programs.
unsuspecting.

Educating and informing less sophisticated owners is now a

major challenge.

As community

Other owners simply let their properties go.

groups now seek ways to recondition these, often with inadequate resources
and know-how, they encounter a maze of red tape.
3.

Income/Expense Gap

.

The actual expenses of maintaining smaller

frame structures often substantially exceed their rental incomes, and

available subsidies were not really used to bridge this gap.

To demonstrate

more visible results, initiatives like subsidized construction were pursued
instead.

Unfortunately, these developments were intensely costly and only

looked as if they would improve neighborhoods, while they actually diverted

attention from the underlying private rental income/expense gap that was
causing general deterioration and disinvestment and made everyone count on
more future subsidies.

Sufficient additional assistance to aid resident households directly is
even less obtainable now.
unlikely.

Increased employment opportunities also seem

Thus tenants will have to choose to double up and pool their

available incomes to obtain decent housing, or discover new ways to become
more resourceful; otherwise, disinvestment in this stock will continue, and
some of
4.

it will be made available to the more affluent.

Excessive Complexity of the Public Sector

.

For years the City has

remained unable to deal effectively with abandoned structures that blight
their surroundings, and the "freezing up" in Tax Title of a significant part
of the stock due to unpaid property taxes.

An enormous bureaucratic tangle has built up around each of the

estimated 6,000 abandoned and tax encumbered properties that remain
standing, which will require both leadership and much patience to resolve.

These tax title buildings represent the City's most substantial source of
new, decent affordable housing. Lf the accumulated taxes are abated,

can be renovated by community groups and private market forces.

excessive red tape,

they

However,

fragmented responsibilities, and lack of coordination

still bar access to this substantial resource.

Programs like the Boston Housing Partnership require extraordinary
effort to produce 500 rehabilitated rental units, and well over $35,000 per

unit in subsidies.

This threatens to soak up most of the remaining

available public resources committed towards housing.

Since private
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interests could do so much more today if red tape were reduced, this no
longer seems the most appropriate response.

Some critics, experienced in

reconditioning Boston's housing in other ways, consider the Partnership
model too rigid, cumbersome and costly, and they fear Linkage will only
prove to be "more of the same."
If the City could cut existing red tape and break out of its

unattainable commitment to produce more affordable rental housing, then
tapping community resourcefulness can "gut rehabilitate" structures for

homeownership for well under half the cost.

Observers cite such Boston

examples as the Land Bank model, Living in Dorchester, Urban Edge, and

Neighborhood Housing Services to substantiate the point.
This search for new approaches has just begun with the Linkage debates
for which Boston's NDEA provided some useful data.

Figure

1

is reproduced

from the NDEA report, Potential Effect of Linkage Funds on Housing

Assistance Programs in Boston

.

Note that the average subsidy required

ranges from $1,500 to $12,000 per unit, and that the participant income

ranges from $13,000 to $22,000, well above the annual incomes of many single
parent households and those on Welfare

—

all those in greatest need.

A serious amount of the general public assistance currently still

available, like welfare and fuel assistance, is also wasted.

Fuel

assistance to tenants pays for heat in uninsulated buildings, and welfare
payment practices often make it more difficult to resolve problems with
tenants.

Proper incentives should encourage existing owners to weatherize

their rental properties, deal effectively with tenant problems and reward

good residents.

Furthermore, the various subsidies and agency regulations are often so

confusing and complicated that small scale, unsophisticated owners, the most
needy, fail to qualify.

Sometimes shrewder operators have managed to

exploit these same programs.

This has induced agencies to redouble their

safeguards, resulting in even more red tape.

B.

Appropriate Local Responses to these Challenges

It must be recognized at the outset that the City can only work at the

margins, redirecting housing demand, rationalizing and clarifying its laws,

regulations and procedures, and providing only limited assistance.
unemployment, which underlies the inadequate incomes of many tenant

High

gja
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Figure

NATURE OF BOSTON'S HOUSING ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES

1:

BY SIZE OF STRUCTURE AND CONSTRUCTION COST

1

- 4
Unit
Buildings

5-9

Unit
Buildings

10 + Unit
Buildings

MODERATE REHABILITATION
Avg. Construction Cost:

$4 - 5K/unit

$1.5K/unit

Average Subsidy:
1

Avg. Participant Income:

$13 - 16K/yr

SUBSTANTIAL REHABILITATION

•

Avg. Construdtion Cost:

$12-13K/unit

Average Subsidy:

$5 - 6K/unit
1

Avg. Participant Income:

$18 - 20K/yr

GUT REHABILITATION
Avg.

Construction Cost:

$8 - 12K/unit

Average Subsidy:
Avg.

$24-40K/unit

Participant Income:

22K/yr

NEW CONSTRUCTION
Avg.

Construction Cost:

Average Subsidy
Avg.

2
:

1

Participant Income:

$40-60K/unit
$10K/unit

$13-15K/yr

2

*7"

City assists large
number of units

Family of four
'At

$40K Construction Cost

X

City assists small
number of units

City assists units
on occasional basis
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households, is a problem beyond the reach of any local housing initiatives.
The City's potential roles are by no means insignificant, but media debates

about housing issues have led many to expect much more

—

far more than is

currently within the power of the city to deliver through any housing
programs.

The new relationships between housing supply and demand make entirely
new and more appropriate responses possible.

Federal homeownership

incentives are a powerful, inescapable subsidy that the City can exploit
instead of ignore.

The important consideration is whether initiatives that

work indirectly are acceptable, ones leveraging more community effort and
private resources.

One observer challenged that "no new City administration

could get by with fewer results to photograph, no ribbons to cut."

However,

if that drawback can be accepted, at least in applying the bulk of the

scarce housing resources, then much more becomes possible:

1.

"Thaw" the inventory of more than ten thousand properties in tax

arrears, by forgiving taxes that are unlikely ever to be paid.

Convey them to new resident owners and non-profit housing
sponsors, expanding the Land Bank model.

2.

Redirect the new housing demand entering Boston's neighborhoods
towards the substandard stock, so private interests do more of the

reconditioning.

This involves both making weaker neighborhoods

more attractive and allowing accessory apartments to be created
where demand is strong.

3.

Provide outright grants to weatherize housing stock occupied by
long term owners and lower income residents. This not only creates

many new local jobs, but will also discourage sales, thereby

averting significant increases in future housing costs.
$800 per unit can achieve substantial energy savings

—

45 units adds a lower skilled job to the local economy.

Less than
and every
It also

pays back in fuel savings in less than four years.

4.

Help residents to buy their dwellings before regional shortages

further raise existing home values.

Much of Boston's existing

stock is worth twice its current market price, if residents knew
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how to maintain it and meet its operating costs.

Were the City to

provide the tools and training suggested in this paper, residents
would capture this rise in home equity for themselves and develop

more pride in their communities at the same time.
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III. SOME CONTEXT AND RECENT HISTORY

Boston's Changing Housing Situation

A.

1.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

•

Private housing remains essential to meeting Boston's housing needs.

Even after many decades of substantial federal and state aid, public

assistance reaches only 16%, one in every six Boston dwellings is assisted.
Focusing on the rental stock, merely one quarter is assisted.
Some of this assisted stock may well be sold off at market prices in

•

coming years (due to Washington budget-cutting), jeopardizing the ability of
even these assisted households to remain without paying much more rent.

Over 54 percent of the dwellings in Boston (some 133,000 units) are

•

still in the private rental stock, much of it provided by resident owners of

small buildings at such low rents that they have been dubbed "friendship

rents."

One-half (nearly 64,000 units) of this private rental stock is in

•

1-4 family homes, frequently resident-owned, matching a similar amount in

private (unassisted) multifamily properties.

Half the rental stock was rented at below $191/month in 1980, much

•

of it in this 1-4 family inventory.

Figure

2:

The Composition of Boston's Housing Stock (i,ooo'*4*^

stock type
owner
du/struc
occupied
Is

2s

3-4s
condo

29.9
17.3
18.0
4.2?

5+ priv.
5+ subs.

TOTAL

69.4

renter
occupied
4.0
20.0
39.8
7

'

total
dwellings

33.9
37.3
57.8
4.2

69.0
42.0

69.0
42.0

174.8

244.2

4,100 ConriOt
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2.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OCCURRED IN THE 1970s, REFLECTING NATIONAL TRENDS

•

Boston's total housing stock grew very little in the past decade.

Assisted production of subsidized housing offset abandonments and losses,
primarily in

absentee-owned 2-6 unit stock.

Also, a substantial number of

larger multi-unit properties were rehabilitated under public programs,

shifting a considerable amount of stock from market rate to assisted
housing.
•

Average household size of renter-occupied units declined 24% from 1970

to 1980, from 2.5 to 1.9 persons per household, while vacancy rates remained

significantly high.

This confirms not only that the overall market for rental

housing was slack, but also suggests that tenants were spreading out to

occupy more space in marginal "hand-me-downs".
•

Tenants increasingly became the disadvantaged remainder

parent families, elderly, minorities, etc.

—

—

single

as others moved out of the

City or became resident owners in response to federal homeowner incentives.
•

Rents did not keep pace with inflation during the 1970s, but many

household incomes did not even keep pace with rents.
•

Rents became increasingly inadequate to cover maintenance or

refinancing.
•

Sometimes not even operating costs were covered.

Some rental housing was disinvested as a throwaway.

Other rental stock

became suitable for conversion to condo ownership.
•

Some owners, fearing vandalism of empty units, preferred renting out

their units at below market rents to leaving them vacant.

Less available

household income, however, led to undermaintenance and disinvestment.
•

Rent skip-outs and challenges, sometimes spurred by Legal Assistance on

the basis of substandard conditions, further reduced rents to the point

where some owners gave up.
•

In hindsight, there was actually an unrecognized housing "surplus" in

the 1970s, as economics and demographics spurred middle class migration to

the suburbs, contributing to abandonment.

Within Boston, this migration

also created a surplus of rental units, allowing households to move about
with ease and even spread out into smaller households.
•

Recent economic conditions now make future growth in new private

housing unlikely, while a sharp change in the federal political climate has
also virtually stopped the expansion of assisted housing.

- 12 3.

BY 1980:

•

Housing conditions and market dynamics came to differ considerably

between the stronger and weaker neighborhoods of the City.

The smaller

properties in minority areas tend to be owned by inexperienced landlords and
exhibit far more symptoms of distress.
•

Lower income tenants throughout the City, even some with financial

assistance, have insufficient funds to meet basic needs.
to cut what corners they can.

This induces many

As a result, owners try to avoid providing

them housing.
•

Smaller-scale, 5-10 unit properties, both the empty and the poorly

managed, are a significant cause of surrounding disinvestment that past

assistance programs have not adequately addressed.

Their owners often have

major difficulties collecting sufficient rents and holding down costs.
•

Lack of management skills is a

critical problem for many owners.

This

affects their ability to collect rents, hold down costs, and provide the
necessary maintenance to avert accelerating deterioration.
•

Rising heating costs are a major factor driving up housing costs for

which no effective programs have yet been devised.
•

Financing costs also add substantially to housing costs when and

wherever properties and sold and refinanced.
•

Many properties are now owned by interests that would like to sell and

are either financed at out-of-date, below market interest rates, or owned

outright.
•

Many are just waiting for the "right offer."

Relatively low past housing demand, coupled with the flow of deep federal

production subsidies, allowed state and local governments to ignore the

continuing loss of countless thousands of private housing units through
abandonment, demolition, and arson.
•

Many past assistance programs, laws and other measures were created

f ragmentally

,

to address symptoms.

These programs were applied without

regard for their deeper impacts, either on future cost-effective maintenance
or on others denied assistance.

Instead of encouraging existing owners

to maintain and weatherize their housing,

some provided disincentives,

actually confusing owners and reducing their sense of control over their own
investments.
•

Tax title accounts and code violations now reflect the roughly one out

of seven properties that are to some degree in economic difficulty.

- 13 •

The estimated 15,000 parcel inventory of Boston tax title properties

provide a major opportunity for producing more affordable housing.

Of this

inventory:

-

5000 are as yet only "six-month loan" parcels, where owners, with
cash flow problems, have elected to "borrow" from the City.

A

significant number can never pay up.

-

3000 are parcels with occupied buildings, often small and
resident-owned, and beset with tenant poverty

and problems, as

well as unsophisticated owners

-

3000 are parcels with abandoned buildings, half of which have been

foreclosed by the City, and half remain in private hands.

Many,

again, are 1-6 unit properties.

-

4000 are vacant lots scattered throughout the city, the end stage.

Many are now unbuildable.

Others should be "land-banked" for

future private development, and leased for interim uses like

Victory gardens.

4.

IN COMING YEARS

•

A rising tide of new demand for housing has begun to enter one

neighborhood after another,

first in close-in Charles town and the South

End, next in parts of Dorchester and Jamaica Plain.

Unlike the tide

however, it usually first touches the better stock on hilltops and glacial

drumlins before invading the flat lands.
•

As regional shortages increase, Boston's stock will seem increasingly

attractive to many households throughout the metropolitan area that do not
yet have housing.

These new households often can neither afford new

construction nor the going prices for existing suburban housing.
•

Current City demographic patterns and projections also identify a

swelling diversity of needs converging on this stock, of which low and

moderate income households and elderly are but two components.

Inadequate

regional production will spur increasingly strong competition for available
and potential dwellings throughout many different neighborhoods.
•

Such shifts in demand promise to sharply inflate property values in the

near future, making it advantageous for any residents who can to "buy in" as
soon as possible, even if today's prices already seem unaffordable to them.
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5.

PREPARING FOR A DIFFERENT FUTURE

These factors have all profoundly altered Boston's housing situation,

•

requiring new responses.

Curtailed conventional and assisted housing

development has already created perceived shortages, rising prices and
rents.

While forcing existing residents to pay more or "double up,"

neighborhood stigraa will also evaporate, making many willing to pay more to
rent and even to consider owning.

Much more existing housing can be reconditioned and maintained by

•

these new trends and market forces than seemed likely a few years ago

_if_

City programs are redesigned to exploit the opportunity. Without planning
however, the new excess of demand will put increasing hardship on tenants.

Already, in newly attractive areas like Dorchester and Jamaica Plain,

•

tenants are pooling incomes and increasing their household size to meet new
rents.

Attempts to convert triple deckers to condominiums for sale to

residents have also begun to be successful.
•

Displacement, by disinvestment, deterioration or arson,

as well as by

speculators in rising markets, imposes substantial hidden costs as residents
are uprooted from familiar surroundings.

After-the-fact public substitutes

for their prior support networks are not only costly and imperfect

—

but

also unavailable.
•

To avoid displacement, the City must shift excessive demand to weaker

markets and increase the supply in stronger areas through appropriate new
private construction and by allowing accessory apartments.
•

Nevertheless, if current trends prevail, there will be more low income,

single person-headed households with dependent children, as well as elderly.

Generally not willing or able to become homeowners, these will swell the
ranks of tenants.

Increasingly, unable to match rents paid by the entering

middle class, they will agitate for more effective rent controls.
•

Rent controls, which only appeared to be effective

in Boston's slack

market of the earlier 1970s, will be inadequate to deflect these incoming
market forces.
•

Using regulations to safeguard the interests of less affluent tenants

facing a soaring demand often results in displacement through arson.
•

Since the federal "Cadillac" low income housing production model is

no longer affordable, new initiatives must be devised that involve residents

more fully as partners in improving their communities.

- 15 -

6.

INFERENCES FOR NEW POLICIES

•

Boston today fortunately has neither San Francisco's overheated,

excessive demand, nor any longer the housing "surpluses" of a St. Louis or
Cleveland.
•

Slowing of both private and assisted production throughout the Boston

region is more the cause of these unanticipated market changes, than the
much heralded demand resulting from new "baby-boom" household formations.
•

Nevertheless, with public assistance curtailed, tenants' expectations

will become an increasing challenge to handle.

Tenant advocates are

forceful interests that will demand either help or a scapegoat.

Their

needs must be accommodated.
•

Boston's current overall balance between housing supply and demand is a

significant, favorable opportunity that can be preserved through new

planning approaches.
•

Now is still a good time for residents to take title to their own

dwellings in Boston.

Much of the stock, however, is currently not yet in

any condition that makes anyone eager to own it.
•

This balance between supply and demand needs to be monitored at the

neighborhood level, however, to identify mismatches before they become
serious.
•

This balance can be preserved through sensitive planning of appropriate

new private developments to meet the demands of newcomers, some limited

assisted production to meet special needs, and allowing accessory apartments
in larger dwellings,

as well as by improving the existing stock in other

ways which enable residents to remain.
•

A significant rent/income gap will remain in many dwellings, however,

which will require greater resourcefulness if not new resources to address.
•

For proper maintenance, many rents, on average, now need to increase by

some $50 per month before regulatory efforts like code enforcement can

become
•

effective.

Rent controls should not even be considered in any situations where a

rent/income gap exists (see Appendix A).

Across-the-board controls can

quickly destroy irreplaceable private housing in any but the strongest
markets.
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•

Title turnover and refinancing should be discouraged wherever possible,

because that increases rents by as much as $100 per month simply to cover
today's interest costs while providing no actual physical improvements to the
dwellings.
•

Many of the residential properties in tax title can be reconditioned if

the City can predictably abate unpaid taxes for new resident owners and non-

profit redevelopers.

This improves both neighborhood image and spurs more

nearby private reconditioning.
•

New initiatives encouraging long

terra

owners to retain title and make

weatherization improvements would provide the best economic payback and
actually benefit existing tenants the most in the long run.
•

New programs that boost resident-ownership (condos in triple deckers,

cooperatives) are also important to develop now, before growing scarcity and
the resurgent interest for living in Boston boost prices further out of
the reach of current residents.
•

Assistance to new construction should be severely limited.

It should

only be employed to address special needs such as transition communities for

welfare dependent, single parent families, or an experimental initiative to

determine the costs and suitability of manufactured homes.
•

The media-supported clamor to power up the outdated and unaffordably

costly low income housing production system (consuming in excess of $20,000
in subsidies per assisted unit) must be strongly resisted, because so much

more housing can now be gained through expanding already existing

neighborhood models committing grants of $1,000-5,000 per dwelling on
reconditioning strategies.

These can leverage much more private effort and

mobilize latent resources throughout communities that still feel blighted
and not vet "linked" to Boston's revitalization.
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B.

1.

The Public Sector Response

PAST DIRECT ASSISTANCE APPROACHES

A Housing Task Force inventoried Boston's housing situation nearly a

decade ago, paying close attention to conditions.

Force reported in 1974 is still relevant today.

Much of what that Task
The housing condition

analysis sought to determine to costs of bringing Boston's entire housing
stock into code compliance.

Condition categories were established, ranging

from "A", units requiring no more than minimal work, to "D", units requiring
gut rehabilitation, and "E", units which should be demolished.

The Task Force report, Housing in Boston (1974), stated "an owner can

•

'gut rehabilitate' units for less than $10,000, provided he owns the

building, it is in fair structural shape, and he is not required to hire and

train unskilled persons, obtain consent of community groups and the like.
In other words, these costs are not to be compared with rehabilitation costs

under federal housing programs like Section 236." (p. 111-10)

Ownership self-interest remains the most cost-effective approach to
housing fix-up, even though costs have doubled. The report further notes,
"The productivity for the [federally assisted] Code Enforcement Program
has been about 67 percent that of the private sector.

.

.

The productivity of

money invested in gut rehabilitation (section 236) has been as low as 40
percent." (p. 111-18) Figure 3 illustrates these cost options in current
dollars.

Back in 1974, the Task Force estimated that reconditioning Boston's

housing would cost $291 million in private investment, If private selfinterest could be harnessed.

At the time, however, it was recognized that

in many sections the market was too weak, and that public investments would

have to come first.

Allowing for the reduced efficiency of public programs,

a well-targetted $268 million in public money was judged necessary to fix up

and demolish the worst properties (in place of the $166 million this would

have cost private owners, had they been motivated).

The federal high cost production model added many thousands of low
income housing units during the 1970s.

continuing private stock losses.

This diverted attention from

Soaring operating costs in these assisted

developments now jeopardize their continued existence as low income housing.
Efforts to "save" these through financial "bail-outs" would absorb even more
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Figure 3:

Fix-up Costs by Rehab Approach

Private

Fix-up Program:
Productivity:
Condition
(Cost of Fix-up
per unit)
A

Good As Is

By Owner
100%

Public
Sec. 312, HIP

66%

Sec. 8

40%

$

$500

$1,000
B

C

D

E

Requiring Modest
Fix-up

Requiring Substantial Fix-up

Requiring Gut
Rehabilitation

Requiring
Demolition

$1,500

B

$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

$6,000

$6,000

-$9,000

C
$15,000

$16,000

$40,000

$20,000

$50,000

D'

.
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resources, far beyond what is now available.

Ways should be explored to

convince HUD to convey them to new owners in good condition for a nominal
sum.

The City lacks the basic research, including some representative income

expense proformas of private and assisted alternatives, to determine where
scarce resources can most effectively be applied.

Appendix B, Monitoring

Neighborhood Change , outlines a vitally needed basic research strategy,
which can take advantage of the recent City-wide property equalization data.

2.

INDIRECT CITY APPROACHES

Ebbing neighborhood confidence was identified as a serious obstacle to

continued private investment in the mid-1970s, and the Neighborhood

Confidence Project was a response, marketing triple deckers and the

neighborhoods then red-lined and out of fashion.

It started with posters

for Dorchester and Jamaica Plain, then a Triple Decker brochure, and

continued with prime time TV specials like Jamaica Plain The Options in
the City .

In its day, this contributed substantially to turning

neighborhood perceptions around, as media coverage and TV specials induced
many to see Boston's prospects through fresh eyes.
The Housing Improvement Program (HIP) resulted as well, which provided
technical assistance and simple rebates to resident owners making code

related improvements to their own properties.

A great many such owners

participated, particularly in areas with renewing confidence
is said, more than once), but problems remain nearby.

(and some, it

Absentee-owned

properties, often accumulating unpaid taxes, discourage and hold back the
market.

Only on some fully abandoned properties did the City initiate actions.

Homesteading was its primary response, enabling a few community groups to
fix up some 65 properties per year with deep public subsidies for transfer
to new, resident owners.

Private interests can now be motivated to recondition these properties.
Each "eyesore" that is improved or removed will leverage a great deal more

private and community effort today.

Homesteading was conceived back when

the private market strength was missing.

model

Today, it is no longer the best
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CURRENT CITY OF BOSTON HOUSING ACTIVITIES

past approaches into an impressive-

The City has continued modifying
looking

array of programs in recent years, but too many are cosmetic and do

not address such underlying problems as the excessive red tape affecting Tax

Title properties.
The Linkage Report to the Mavor

,

Appendix VII (October 1983) provides a

useful summary of all the current public housing initiatives, which should
be consulted for more detail.

The Office of Housing, part of the

Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency (NDEA)
the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)

,

has handled many of

initiatives, and the Boston

Redevelopment Authority has supported a number of projects creating housing
with Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) assistance.

I.

II.

CDBG-Assisted Housing Programs

(FY 1984: c. $13.5 million)

1.

Cash Back Program

closed out

2.

Cash Up-front Program

$1.3 million

3.

Home Loan Program

4.

Rental Rehab Demonstration Program

.4

5.

Deferred Loan Pilot Program

.2

6.

Homesteading Program

7.

Section 312 Rehabilitation Loan Program

8.

Housing Creation Initiative

9.

Boston Housing Partnership, Inc.

.6

10.

Abandoned Property Preservation Program

.65

11.

BHA Development Modernization/Security

12.

Neighborhood Housing Services

.6

13.

Fair Housing Commission

.55

14.

Community Disorders Unit

.07

UDAG-Assisted Housing Programs

1.2

3.1
.4

1.05

3.4

(c.

$26.2 million)

1.

Copley Place

2.

Columbia Point (seeking $20 million more)

3.5

3.

Neighborhood Housing UDAG

1.4

4.

Westland Avenue

1.8

5.

Lower Mills

$18.8 million

(0.7 pending)

.7

- 21 -

Evaluating, or even describing each of these programs is well outside
the scope of this paper.

However, it is important to recognize that

adopting new approaches will encounter the resistance of many constituencies
expecting all of the above to continue and expand.
many of these programs are on a per unit basis

—

Few realize how costly
both in direct public

subsidies as well as in terms of unrecorded staff time and effort.
Some of the City

programs already represent shifts in the directions

advocated in this paper.

For example, it has become policy of the Office of

Housing to grant resources to complete one "free" weatherization item (attic
insulation, or storm windows) to all participants in its housing programs.

Other programs are directed at restoring a few key structures blighting
neighborhoods, but the federal Davis-Bacon provisions requiring the payment
of prevailing market wages (union-scale) inescapably force costs far higher

than if community residents provided more of the actual labor.

This simply

underscores the 1974 Housing Task Force finding that acting through owner
self-interest remains a much more cost-effective way to maintain and

recondition housing.

4.

APPROPRIATE RECENT INITIATIVES

Changing existing laws and procedures is essential if better use of

available assistance is to be attained.

What to do about blighting

properties and property tax delinquency has been a sore issue with community

residents for at least twenty years.

City powers to foreclose and auction

were rarely utilized because unpaid taxes so easily exceeded market value of
the property.

Now, with the market resurgence and the reduced assessments

on these properties (due to revaluation and Proposition 2 1/2), more

effective solutions are becoming possible.
State foreclosure legislation, dating from the Depression, has long
been overdue for reform.

This year, the City is more aggressively seeking a

comprehensive rewrite of General Law chapter 60, governing the collection of
local taxes. Accelerating foreclosure, holding trustees responsible, and

otherwise clarifying and expediting procedures, are all part of this year's
vitally important taxation study package.

Passing these revisions is

essential to "thawing" the City's large inventory of tax title properties.
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RETAP,

for Rehabilitation of Tax-Abated Properties, is a most welcome

new City initiative, also known as "8 of 53," for sec. 8 of Gen'l Laws

chapter 58.

On an experimental basis,

the Boston Assessor supports tax

abatement applications of qualified resident (or non-profit) buyers of 1-6
unit tax delinquent and deteriorated properties to the State Commissioner of

Revenue.

The purpose is to forgive enough of the unpaid taxes to make

immediate rehabilitation feasible.
Action on a RETAP application is promised within 60 days by the City,
but the state Department of Revenue still presents hurdles.

So far, tapping

the City's large inventory of tax delinquent properties has not yet become

"standard operating procedure."

However, according to Lynn Rowan, the RETAP

Coordinator in the Assessing Department,

interest on the part of ordinary

citizens as well as some community groups in this recent program is rapidly
mounting.

Those familiar with tax collection and assessing will recognize

that even this administrative breakthrough has not been easy to achieve.

It

requires seeing taxes not merely as a revenue problem but as an important

housing issue.

Utilizing RETAP, Living in Dorchester and the Codman Square Housing
Development Corp have both been able to restore properties and make them
affordable for homeownership.
costs

—

For Pat Cook of Living in Dorchester total

acquisition, fix-up, and construction financing

under $12,000 a unit.

—

have stayed

This results in $300 monthly carrying costs with a

20 year $15,000 mortgage at 8% interest (from tax exempt financing).

These

experiences suggest that public write-downs at sale, combined with private
(no strings) construction financing, are a better way to produce affordable

housing, now that private financing is again readily available.
A one-time public write down of around $5,000

is sufficient to reduce

resulting final costs after fix-up in many different market areas to under
$15,000 per unit.

agencies like MHFA,

If more 8% mortgages can be provided through public

this not only produces affordable housing but also a

more lasting neighborhood recovery than most section 8 rental developments.
At higher permanent financing rates of course, greater write-downs at sale

would be needed.

The Mutual Bank for Savings has confirmed these economics.

Since

appropriate stock can still be bought today for well under $10,000 per unit,
this bank has been providing the construction financing sought by groups
like Living in Dorchester

.
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The Massachusetts Government Land Bank has developed a fully
functioning program for the reconditioning of deteriorated, tax delinquent

properties from its experiences with similar non-profit groups.

The Land

Bank model utilizes RETAP, and then provides state tax exempt financing for

homeownership

,

to be expanded.

and demonstrating that existing community capacity only needs

David Knisely of the Land Bank stresses that the model has

been working for some time, but to "fine-tune" it, tax abatements must

become more predictable, and applications must be processed promptly by the
state Department of Revenue.

The Land Bank is currently selecting additional capable redevelopers.
It is prepared to shoulder the necessary risks, and then continue to

provide 8% 20 year homeowner mortgages on a pilot basis.

This is a model

that MHFA could adapt and expand for similar situations all over the state.

5.

THE LACK OF AN OVERALL HOUSING POLICY

There has been a proliferation of assistance programs in recent years,
basically leveraged by CDBG and UDAG resources.

Gaining an overview of the

results of all these public expenditures is extremely difficult because so

many specific initiatives are being without any overall policy concept.

The Jamaica Plain Community Housing Task Force is one significant
community response to the vacuum in overall planning and communication.
It has expanded to include members from all over Boston and begun to act as
a clearing house for many new ideas worth consideration.

However, after

years of unresolved "housing crises," it seems there is still no end of

worthy objectives, no light at the end of any specified tunnel.

Awareness of an important opportunity is emerging, nevertheless.

Many

more residents could be helped through minor assistance, costing under $1000
per household.

On a very limited scale, ESAC, the Ecumenical Social Action

Committee in Jamaica Plain, has been specializing in meeting such repair
needs, particularly of the elderly:

porches, stairs, railings, plumbing,

windows, gutters, electrical, roof, and ceilings.

ESAC has been arranging

such repairs for under $400 per household and thereby leveraging additional

improvements in the surrounding community.

ESAC may well be unique; it

generally seems difficult to provide only limited assistance when needs
appear overwhelming.
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An overall guiding concept and sense of direction remain lacking

throughout the City.

There is no real policy planning.

The City needs to

identify changes in market dynamics and appropriate interventions to

influence who will live in the City a decade from now.

Planner

participation in forums like the Community Housing Task Force is essential
to determine what has actually been accomplished with past assistance, what

new needs have arisen, and what is most effective in leveraging more

revitalization.

Identifying the counter-productive reactions to past

assistance initiatives is also vital.
A new guiding concept is needed that is more appropriate to the new

realities.

Since these have not yet been properly confirmed, discussions

often remain tied to outdated problem definitions and fail to take advantage
of new opportunities.

To paraphrase Margaret Mead, the people can describe how and where
their shoes pinch; it takes a shoemaker to improve the situation.

Now is a

good time to reconsider past housing approaches and determine which of them

have been cost-effective, to decide what should be continued and why, and to

design new initiatives that harness Boston's renewed vitality in ways that

benefit more of its residents.
leading to new actions.

This paper can only initiate discussions
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IV.

DECISION OPTIONS

Housing affordability will remain an inescapable problem for many

Years of public promises and

Boston residents for the foreseeable future.

the creation of many publicly assisted developments have maintained the

illusion that decent, affordable housing would eventually be provided

directly by public initiatives.
The familiar, widely used low income housing production system requires
a great deal more in subsidies per unit than taxpayers now appear willing to

support.

dormancy.

Federal assistance cutbacks have forced this model into partial
However, since it involves so many actors

non-profit as well as profit-making interests

—

—

community groups and

these are all actively

promoting extension of the compound subsidy approach with whatever public
resources can be obtained: Linkage funds, state assistance, even selling

municipal properties like parking garages.

Before supplying more resources

to heavy subsidy models like the Boston Housing Partnership, some basic

policy questions must be considered.

Working closely with communities is a widely espoused goal.

To many,

this simply means working them into the Federal model, not just to advise,
but to become employed.

To those disregarding the economics, this appears

appealing because there seems to be something for each participant.

One

critic however, has called it "The Cadillac model, funding three-piece
suits."

From a broader perspective, only a very limited number of residents

and tenants actually benefit.

Fortunately, new initiatives are now possible

that can be designed to involve a greater number of residents in many more

flexible ways.

A.

Affordability

The rent gap for many Boston households in private housing will

continue to grow.

Appendix A explains in detail why this will occur, and

also shows how across-the-board rent controls and other regulations imposed

without understanding the underlying economics and market dynamics would
only make situations much worse in the long run.

Policy makers will become forced to admit, at least to themselves, that
with only some $16 million in discretionary annual housing resources, plus a
few UDAGs, there is little that can be done directly about affordability,
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which is essentially an income and employment problem.
Since the available public resources are unlikely to be spent as

housing vouchers to simply reduce every household's rent gap, the policy
options narrow to deciding what types of production and/or fix-up models
should be encouraged in the future.

Should a few households be helped

visibly and substantially, or many more through more limited support per

household?

Which models provide the biggest "bang for the buck?"

The private market still provides useful reference points.

In Boston

today, it can deliver decent housing for some $400-450 per month, or around

$4,800-5,400 per year.
to $300-350 monthly.)

(As long as refinancing can be avoided, this drops

Private interests today can also still acquire,

recondition and make such stock available for sale to homebuyers for less
than $15,000 per unit.

The Mutual Bank for Savings, which provides the

financing to some private entrepreneurs, confirms that they make sufficient
profits in this enterprise to remain in business.

Accessory apartments are affordable housing that is being created
elsewhere in response to strong market demand that new construction cannot
address.

In strong Boston neighborhoods, there is now tremendous potential

for converting underutilized rooms, attic or basement spaces into additional

efficiencies, studios, and mother-in-law apartments

—

without undermining

surrounding property values.
The homeowner typically needs to invest only several thousand dollars
to create a new dwelling yielding $2,000 to 4,000 annually in extra income.

Renting at $175 to $325 monthly, this affordable housing quickly pays back
the owner's investment.

Such conversions provide more than just economic

benefits to both homeowner and tenant:
•

Small apartments for both young and old households seeking

affordable rental housing
•

Supplemental income for older homeowners

•

Security for older homeowners from fear of criminal intrusion
or personal accidents when alone

•

A way for older homeowners to stay comfortably in homes they

might otherwise have to leave
Fostering accessory apartments, or "granny flats" as they are termed in
California, requires merely relaxing zoning standards.

In fact in many

cities and towns surrounding Boston, countless such apartments have already
been created, through building inspectors "merely looking the other way."
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How these should be taxed is a natural question.

The City could of

course raise the property's assessment and derive some revenues, but this

would render the apartments that much less affordable.

Most jurisdictions,

including such fashionable areas as Westport and Weston, Connecticut, have
not reassessed, which renders this new housing that much more affordable.

Homesharing can also provide more affordable housing.

Homeowners with

an empty bedroom, seeking companionship, some extra income, help in

maintaining their housing, or perhaps services in lieu of rents, can be
matched with complementary individuals needing shelter.
West Suburban Elder Services has been successfully providing such
services in Boston's suburbs for years. Homesharing in Seattle, a city
similar in size to Boston but now with a very tight housing market,

estimates Seattle still has over 100,000 "empty" bedrooms.

There obviously

is a major opportunity of providing good shelter at reasonable cost if

inexpensive match-up services can be set up.

College room-mate matching,

which for-profit services will do by telephone for under $100 per successful
match, is on the low cost side.

At the other extreme, homesharing can

involve comprehensive services including home inspections, multiple
interviews and references, and even crisis intervention, in which case,
costs become too great

to-

consider this "affordable" housing.

As with

accessory apartments, there can be a host of benefits in such new
arrangements, beyond economics.

B.

Resident Ownership Makes Housing More Affordable

The Land Bank model, providing tax-exempt mortgages, has recently

demonstrated that when unpaid Boston property taxes are waived, some
non-profit groups can produce decent affordable housing units for under
$15,000 by reconditioning tax title property.
eight

percent, this costs around $300 monthly,

reach of any household with a $12,000 income.

Financed for 20 years at
which places it within
Unassisted, using market rate

financing, the monthly costs would be nearer $400, requiring a $16,000

household income.
For any Boston household which can be induced to buy the unit in which
it resides, the gap between what it can afford and the market price of

decent housing is actually quite modest because the value of the stock is
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still so depressed.

Even using only private developers and financing, a

one-time public writedown of less than $5,000 is required to make decent
units available for only $10,000.

This places such housing within reach for

many households.

Devoting the entire $16 million in available housing resources to this

approach would recondition over 3,000 rental dwellings a year, transforming
that many households into homeowners.

This not only provides them growing

equity but enables them to share in the coming boom in Boston housing
values.

It also quickly builds community pride.

If this "writedown model" could further be targetted upon those

structures most blighting to their neighborhood surroundings, then it would

leverage even more community effort and private resources, virtually

"bootstrapping" the neighborhood to a market recovery.

C.

Reconditioning Tax Title Properties

"Thawing" the Tax Title inventory of smaller buildings should be

considered since so much of it is highly visible, sapping neighborhood
confidence.

Some buildings should be demolished, but the rest can be fixed

up, involving community residents in deciding which properties should be

fixed up and where they would like to invest scarce public resources.

Repairs can then be handled by such community based models as Living in

Dorchester

,

Urban Edge

,

pursuing the RETAP/Land Bank approach.

There are

scores of community based groups which can help set new priorities for

scarce public resources, if the City would define some explicit alternatives
and provide some market data on costs and rent gaps.

The costs in public write-downs to make the housing affordable would be
very similar to the preceding homeownership model, as demonstrated by recent

Land Bank activities, but city and state would have to reduce existing red
tape.

An experimental Transition community for needy, single parent families

could also be created from this stock to meet a critical need in Boston.
A variant of congregate housing, transition communities provide temporary

shelter.

In Warren Village in Denver, the best example, families come,

benefit from a year's stay to begin to rebuild their lives.

They utilize

the counselling and day care services provided, find jobs, and then move out
to hold their own.

There, section 8 subsidies, combined with creative
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private assistance, help one family after another.

This contrasts with the

usual Section 8 development housing people permanently dependent on

assistance.

Any existing, multifamily stock could be utilized, but deep

subsidies are required.

In this model, however, the human transformations

justify such deep public expenditures.

D.

Weatherization

Policy makers should consider weatherization of existing stock as

another very cost-effective strategy
treatment of a triple-decker

—

windows, and caulking

—

to reduce housing costs.

Proper

full attic and wall insulation, storm

costs around $2,000, under $700 per unit.

This

provides much unskilled employment, which future fuel savings can pay for.

Every fifteen such frame structures net a full work-year of additional
employment within Boston.
Applied as energy conservation grants, the same $16 million available

annually in discretionary housing resources would result in over 22,000
weatherized units every year, and create over 500 new jobs lasting as long
as the weatherizing program continued.

These jobs would be even more suited

to the less skilled than those provided by the fix-up for homeownership

models above.

Furthermore, weatherization would at least reduce future

increases in resident housing costs by capping heating bill now averaging
$600-$ 1,200 annually..

The preceding alternatives certainly provide many attractive payoffs.
Each should be considered more fully before refueling the dormant Federal

$35,000 per unit model which can produce little more than 400 units from the
entire $16 million.

Some mix should be the outcome, tailored by resident

participation in community discussions of these alternatives.

E.

Fine-Tuning Interventions to Market Dynamics

To obtain the greatest possible response from the available public
resources, the City's new housing approach must also become more sensitive to

widely different market contexts.

In many areas,

private resources can now

be harnessed to do much of the reconditioning and pay for it as well.

City

policies and programs need to differentiate among market areas as well as by
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property types.

Monitoring neighborhood change is becoming an essential research
activity for the City or an "Urban Observatory."

Appendix B proposes a way

of doing such basic research, and outlines some reasons for it.

In brief,

growing demand in many neighborhoods now can actually make "pump priming"

approaches effective.

Results in some market areas become possible with

far less effort than was required in the past.

It is like getting something

moving, but in many neighborhoods, the road is no longer "uphill."

Those

administering public resources must now avoid needless spending to achieve
revitalization.
The City should develop a new array of assistance programs attuned to
the strength of the surrounding market contexts, and draw upon the advice of

residents and private interests in fine-tuning the mix.

In stable

neighborhoods City interventions should be limited to maintaining that
market stability.

Weaker markets should receive the bulk of the attention and public
resources.

Here, new initiatives should visibly improve the housing fabric

in ways that stimulate neighborhood recovery so that assistance can again

influence private decisions (instead of replace private actions).

Appropriate strategies include fixing or removing "eyesore" properties,
helping provide work

write-ups and weatherization, aiding the elderly,

forgiving back taxes in cases where homeowership and affordable housing
result, and persuading tenants to become homeowners or members of cooperatives.

Even such mundane actions as enabling people to garden on vacant

lots are important

—

to reduce public pressures to cover these with

expensive new assisted housing developments.

F.

A Set of New

Neighborhood Supportive Strategies

Solutions to many of the previously identified housing problems lie in
boosting demand in Boston's weaker neighborhoods, while reducing tenant-

landlord polarization, the number of intervening actors, and the complex

regulations and conflicting objectives of the many agencies that were
created with the intention of helping the disadvantaged.

Improving the prospects for both this stock and its current residents
also requires increasing the savvy of its current owners, and enhancing the

attractiveness of neighborhoods by improving their image and certainty of

.
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the future.

Efforts spent on marketing, mediation, neighborhood capacity building,

weatherizing and promoting resident ownership, should match dollars spent
subsidizing physical construction.

•

In areas of relative market stability, the City should limit its

interventions to a market-supportive role.

—

However, it should:

Discourage sales of residential properties unless conditions
warrant

—

Encourage weatherization, heating system upgrading/conversions, and
paint and facade improvements that complement private initiatives.

•

The main efforts should be directed towards correcting imbalances in

the more troubled markets, concentrating particularly on the needs of the

smaller-scale owners.

Here the guiding principle linking rights and

responsibilities espoused by the New Haven Housing Court is useful:

—

Owners are entitled to rent, but must provide habitable premises.

Tenants have the responsibility to pay rent along with rights that
must be protected.

Illustrative supporting strategies accompany each of the four major

objectives in the following section.

Objectives

1

and 2 are stated first

because they are both critical and more difficult to attain than objectives
3 and 4, which can be pursued by the City acting unilaterally.

OBJECTIVE

1

:

Improve Supply/Demand Balances and Certainties

Boosting effective demand through more assistance provided directly to
lower income households would require more federal and state aid than is
ever likely to become available.

Redirecting excess housing demand to

weaker areas, however, can easily be done by the City.

1.1: Marketing on-going neighborhood changes and publicizing the long range

plans are important to boost neighborhood confidence.

For example,

neighborhood marketing, house tours, street fairs, and community festivals
can address neighborhood image problems.

This strategy is inexpensive to

pursue, but it must be done indirectly, acting through community interests.
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Visible reconditioning of tax title properties, especially the

conspicuous, 3-10 unit buildings as well as some selective demolitions, will
turn around negative neighborhood perceptions when tied in with some key

public improvements.

Visible fix-up works like pump-priming in areas where

confidence can be restored.
Properly administered, a modest initial public commitment can trigger a
market resurgence, inducing others to fix-up properties without seeking

additional subsidies. An average write-down of some $5,000 per unit, or
$10,000 to 50,000 per targetted property, is required.

1.3: Community involvement .

Such fix-up should be coordinated through

community-based organizations, setting priorities for limited neighborhood
fix-up and improvement budgets, allocated on the basis of need.

These

community budgets would help the City determine how much weatherization, how
many tax title properties (or how many trees) should be done each year.

Staffing time for "interactive planning" is the main cost.

1.4: Media coverage .

As improvements take place, community interests can

best capture TV and news attention to interpret and broadcast the significant

changes that are rebuilding neighborhood image, such as the establishment of

cooperative ownership of some small, multifaraily properties or their

conversion to condominium tenure by residents.

The Neighborhood Confidence

project in the late 1970s demonstrated that the City only needs to provide
the know-how.

1.5: Publicizing Future Neighborhood Improvements .

Three year plans for

public improvements, as well as new initiatives for rehabilitation,

weatherization, and appropriate new developments for meeting special needs
should be publicized by the City.

1.6: Publicizing Future Socio-demographic Trends

.

The City should also

release socio-economic and demographic projections, which are often more
positive than most people's fears.

This helps reduce the feelings of risk

and uncertainty in transitional areas and encourages further investments by

current owners, instead of more sales to the unsophisticated. No additional
costs are incurred.
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OBJECTIVE

2

:

Educate and Inform Small-scale Owners

Many owners now need help in understanding their options and handling
their problems.

For example, those unaware of available assistance also

often fail to grasp their responsibilities in holding and accounting for
tenant security deposits, and thus end up in Housing Court.

2.1: Training Sessions and Community Workshops . Identify common problems

encountered by unsophisticated owners and encourage community-based

organizations to develop appropriate solutions, e.g. effective rent
collection, eviction, and weatherization measures, how to develop tenant

pride and participation in maintenance, more cost-effective repair
strategies, etc.

Private interests can provide the support; the City should

coordinate and schedule sessions, as appropriate, at least at the beginning.

2.2: Technical assistance .

Foster the provision through local organizations

of technical assistance in management techniques to small owners, utilizing

expertise from the private sector.

2.3: Mediation services can help tenants and landlords work out their

differences before their relations polarize further and disinvestment
accelerates.

Assuming an average cost of $250 per case (less than one

month's rent), an annual budget of $250,000 would permit 1,000 cases to be

mediated every year, greatly reducing local housing conflicts and saving
substantial amounts of housing in the longer run.

2.4: Stop-gap repair services, guidance and technical assistance for the

elderly, a la ESAC, would enable many to continue residing in their

dwellings.

Providing technical assistance and guidance to owners seeking to

create accesssory apartments can "produce" a substantial amount of

affordable rental housing.

2.5: Brochures, Disseminating Techniques and Information can help both

owners and tenants clarify their respective rights and responsibilities.

As

the above initiatives identify common problems, effective remedies will

emerge.

Various channels exist for informing owners.

For example, debates

about conditions upon occupancy and who caused subsequent damage can be
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handled through a Certificate of Habitability, based on a file which

includes interior and exterior pictures, taken at time of listing for
rental.

Usage of such a system should then be promoted through the Housing

Court, the Rental Housing Association, neighborhood and community groups,

Realtors and Legal Assistance.

Even inserts in tax and utility bills can be

used to promote consciousness of particular issues like weatherization.

OBJECTIVE 3

:

Reduce the Income/Expense Gap

Discouraging discretionary sales can help hold down financing costs,
and thereby rents, because properties owned for some time usually have lower

debt service.

Such inducements as generous weatherization grants (or

abatements and assessment deferrals) for owners holding title for more than
five years would discourage needless sales.

If weatherization grants are

provided, liens lapsing after five years would further encourage existing

owners to remain, holding down rents more effectively than rent controls.

3.1: Considerable basic research into normal, private housing costs will be

an outgrowth of monitoring neighborhood change, as elaborated in Appendix B.

Such research is critical to developing more cost-effective public

initiatives and interventions.

It must not be ignored because it does not

directly "seem to be doing anything."

3.2: Housing cost benchmarks

.

Income/expense proformas can be created for

monitoring representative properties and developed into a reliable system
for determining actual housing costs.

Boston currently lacks economic

yardsticks for judging actual housing performance analogous to miles per
gallon statistics for automobiles.

obtaining "less than 10 m.p.g."

—

Many 5-10 unit structures seem to be
and a "free gallon now and then" of fuel

assistance is not really an answer.
Benchmarks would lead to discovery of more efficient ways to provide
housing services from the existing stock, like downsizing units to meet the
demands of smaller households.

A research budget of $50,000 per year

committed to monitoring and interpreting costs in a representative set of

benchmark properties would help rationalize the chronic housing debates.
This initiative might also be supported by some private interests such as
the Greater Boston Board of Realtors or the Rental Housing Association.
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3.3: A housing code more sensitive to health-impairing violations and actual

cost of repairs would result in more rational use of rent revenues.

Pittsburgh made code enforcement more "sensitive" by developing a
professional scoring system for violations, which also became the basis for

effective rent escrowing to resolve serious deficiencies.
Cases violating such a more realistic code should be pursued even
when residents move out, to assure that repairs are actually made before

conditions get worse and more costly to correct.

Consistent violators

should also be listed publicly and barred from participation in any City
programs.

This requires a serious staff commitment, but no new budget

outlays.

3.4: Rent Escrowing . Secure better code compliance so that basic repairs are

made before conditions worsen, following the Pittsburgh model.

Establish

rent escrowing accounts with a neutral party to encourage timely repairs and

assure that rents are actually collected and released to owners upon

completion of repairs.

3.5: Improvement incentives for small-scale, longer term owners for

weatherization

,

heating system conversions and other such measures reduce

operating costs, as previously discussed.

Grants averaging $500-1,000 per

unit are required.

3.6: Potential economies of scale .

Limited equity cooperatives and other

groups can take advantage of economies of scale in purchasing insurance,

accounting, legal counsel, general maintenance and materials, and other
services.

Individuals with relevant expertise in the private sector could

help in such efforts.

3.7: Adaptive Re-use .

Develop experimental pilot projects to meet special

needs such as transitional communities for single parent families, as

discussed in section IV C.

3.8: Creating Accessory Apartments .

Considering how much average household

size has recently declined, some owners should be encouraged to downsize

their individual units so that they cost less to heat and maintain.

experimental rehabilitation should be tried to evaluate the costs and

Some

-
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benefits of reducing the size (while increasing the number) of dwellings in

representative existing structures.
Boston night also foster new ways that increase household size and
"pool" resources,

like encouraging in-laws and elderly to remain with their

families, reversing recent trends and utilizing available shelter more
fully.

OBJECTIVE 4

:

In the past,

Revise Assistance Programs and Regulations

cities encouraged new, assisted construction in weaker

neighborhoods, often a self-defeating approach when it weakened the local
market for existing housing by diverting some of the remaining demand into
the new developments.

Federal rehab programs also commonly encouraged

owners to count on special low interest financing, causing many to postpone

repairs until they could obtain it.

Taken together, past housing assistance

often inadvertently compounded market weaknesses and increased dependence on

more aid.

4.1: Expedite Tax Abatements and Reduce Tax Delinquencies .

Extending RETAP

beyond 12/31/83 and revising chapter 60 will not only produce affordable

housing (with little additional subsidies), but also leverage considerable

improvements in surrounding properties.

Simplify administrative procedures

wherever possible.

4.2: Streamline Assistance .

Each agency seeking to improve housing

conditions must simplify, clarify, and publicize its programs so residents
have less need of interveners to receive their benefits.

Current assistance

practices often have little recognized but critical counter-productive side

effects that waste a great deal of public and private resources.

For

example, paying directly for energy used and preventing utility shut-offs,

discourages weatherization.

Energy programs must be fundamentally

reconsidered.

4.3: Fuel Assistance and Winter Utility Protection Law

.

Revise energy

assistance so that market incentives for owners to weatherize are restored.
Bring together owners, tenants, and utility representatives to change the

system so tenants at least bear part of their utility responsibilities.
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Interventions at the state and federal level are necessary to achieve such
program revisions.

4.4: The Welfare System .

Simplify assistance procedures and increase

housing and heating allowances to the extent possible.

Welfare payments for

rent are not only inadequate, but must allow the owner to be fully paid by
the first of the month.

Welfare cut-offs should be communicated to owners

immediately, before they lose any rent.

4.5: Certificate of Habitability .

The Housing Inspection Department should

become the certifier of conditions for all assistance programs.

Inspections

at change of occupancy with interior and exterior photographs would reduce

grounds for tenant/landlord conflict.

4.6: New Weatherization and Improvement Incentives . See strategy 3.5 as well

as section IV D, above.

G.

In Other Words :

The private rental system now operates quite wastefully and

inefficiently.

Rents are often not fully collected.

Money that goes to

lawyers could be redirected towards improving the housing.

Resources that

are now simply spent on energy could be invested to reduce heat losses.

In

some areas, small households occupy. space that used to housing more members.

Now is the ideal time to reconsider how the rental housing system can
be fine-tuned to conserve more of the affordable stock, before housing

markets become much stronger and any new assistance programs are devised in
Washington.
undervalued;

Boston's stock remains a great resource that is still
much of it is owned by investors used to only limited returns.

Pursued with some imagination and skill to avoid the need to refinance this
housing at today's market interest rates, considerable improvements are
possible if the spirit of the preceding strategies is properly grasped and

consistent new programs and intiatives are developed.
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IN CONCLUSION

Expectations now shape countless housing decisions to move or stay,
sell or buy, invest or do nothing.

Many neighborhood changes proceed from

misleading perceptions that too easily become self-fulfilling prophecies.
To redirect housing actions wherever the urban fabric is coming under stress
now requires understanding "governance" and dealing with the expectations

already shaping the behavior of all the various housing interests.

motivates and constrains each one?
altered through public policies?

What

How can their behavior be beneficially
We must first understand what really

shapes housing behavior instead of simply continuing to spend public

resources in ways that conventional wisdom and the most vocal community
leaders seem to direct.
To harness the market forces transforming neighborhoods, requires

reconsidering codes and zoning regulations, property revaluation and tax
foreclosure procedures, as well as the influence of recent local assistance
practices.

Many challenging issues today, like tax title and disinvestment,

are surrounded by an intricate but little considered web of rules and

payoffs to the many interests affected.

For lack of a better word, this new

concept is called "governance."

Planners now must consider perceived problems and become more explicit
in what the City seeks to accomplish.

No longer can they simply respond

with public subsidies to address symptoms. A self-assessment can guide this
process, following a checklist of neighborhood revitalization questions

posed in Figure 4.

Consider dealing with an abandoned, delinquent six unit apartment
building.

An owner with cash flow problems may have only intended to "take

out an informal loan" from the City, but before he realized it, he soon owed

more to the Tax Collector than he could pay back.

Then again, he may have

deliberately allowed rental properties to deteriorate in order to qualify
for federal subsidies.

The City, instead of simply earmarking the property

for assisted rehab in the next Partnership

or UDAG package, must now

address the underlying causes of the situation.
This situation may actually have been caused by too little demand and

curtailed private lending, compounded by counterproductive city assessment,
rent control, and code enforcement procedures that drove responsible owners
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y^r"re 5.1:

Checklist of Questions lor Redirecting Neighborhood Revitallzation

Analyzing the Situation

—

How is the neighborhood "system" malfunctioning? As compared to a stable, well-working neighborhood, what actors are not performing their expected roles? Which of the neighborhood's usual "coping
mechanisms" has broken down?
What is the rang*} of city powers and resources available lo address this problem? What does local
government seek to accomplish?
What roles can private institutions and community interests play in helping to address this problem?
Who are the key actors in the neighborhood for this particular issue? How does the city relate to these
actors
through subsidies, regulations, taxation, licensing, or provision of infrastructure? Can any of these
be adjusted to serve as an incentive/disincentive to help resolve the issue at hand?
Why is "du r.j'.hing" net an app.cprjate local government response to the situation?

—
—
—
—
—
Weighing the Alternatives
—What are the
associated with any approach being considered?
—Policy analysis a must. What costs and benefits are associated with each alternative? Who win
and who
lose
a particular approach
chosen?
— How each the major neighborhood interests (home owners, tenants, bankers,
insurers,
t

politics

will

is

will

will

is

if

realtors,

of

merchants, organizers, and others) be affected by the alternatives? What, if anything, will each be encouraged/
discouraged to do?
Neighborhood, diagnosis is essential. What are current neighborhood conditions? How do residents
and others feel about ths neighborhood? How have these conditions and attitudes been changing?
How much of the city's motivation for action is that "everybody else is doing it?" How much is
desperation "we have to do something" a factor? Have these factors discouraged or influenced objective
policy analysis in any way?
Implementation Considerations
How long will it take for the strategy to start working? Are neighborhood market conditions likely to
have changed by then? If so. what will the strategy do, given the new market conditions?
What steps must be taken to in ilement the approach? What approvals are required? What new
"systems" are needed?
What city agency will take the lead in implementing the strategy? Will it be sensitive to the perspectives
of other interests or will it pay more attention to agency preferences?
—If. after implementation, the approach is found to have seriously undesirable effects, how easily could
the policy be withdrawn or modified?
Gauging the Impact
What measures of outcome will be used to assess the impacts of the strategy?
What are likely to be the particular impacts of the strategy on the various interests, public, private,
and community, in the neighborhood?
Once the strategy has made its impact, will the affected neighborhood be made more self-sufficient

—
—

—

—

—
—
—

—
—
—
or more government dependent?
—What would happen the neighborhood

in
if the strategy was not used and the city did nothing?
Source: Adapted by R. Goeize from "Rediscovering Governance: Using Non-Service Approaches to
Address Neighborhood Problems; A Guide for Local Officials," SRI-lnternational, Menlo Park, California,
February 1980, pp. 77-78.
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to sell out to the less experienced some time ago.

Private lending for

improvements may have been withdrawn because rental income seemed
inadequate; reassessment may only reflect false values, based on condominium

conversion potential.

Controlling rents and enforcing codes then without

adding income is futile, encouraging more tax delinquency and arson.
The actual causes may not be welcome revelations, but subsidizing such

rehabilitation only compounds matters when "governance" is actually spurring
disinvestment and public resources are inadequate to help everyone.

Dysfunctional aspects of the system need to be corrected, not disguised.

This new approach to policy formulation is important because it allows
the City to eventually free itself from reliance on ever more public

assistance to be spent in traditional ways.

It permits the City to design

new strategies instead, using the available public resources more
effectively.
The frequently endorsed Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) model in

Pittsburgh developed out of such a joint public, private and community
process reexamining the actions and causes shaping neighborhood dynamics.
There, a partnership process forged effective new constituencies which

revised local codes and zoning, dealt with negative neighborhood images,

changed inappropriate forms of public assistance, as well as boosted

maintenance and managerial savvy on the part of owners.
In Boston, similar reforms in governance are long overdue.

shedding a heavy handicap, the results will prove liberating.

Like

Reexamining

governance can produce new initiatives that are more appropriate, tailored
to the local situations in ways no centralized planning or federal program

guidelines could ever achieve.

Boston's widely emulated Housing Improvement

Program, granting owners direct cash rebates instead of cumbersome interest

reduction loans, was a suitable innovation in its day; marketing neighborhood images and triple-deckers, was another appropriate initiative.

Today,

weatherization, increasing resident ownership, and "thawing" the Tax Title
inventory, are opportunities awaiting similar fresh, innovative approaches.

This creative approach to policy formulation draws upon insights

already present "out in the grass roots," but is easily suppressed by

unthinking reliance on past models.

These latent insights remain there,

however, only waiting to be tapped by public officials and private interests

through a better of grasp of neighborhood change and new opportunities.
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Many may doubt that such a radical redefinition of local effort is
They may

called for, skeptical how much more productive it can actually be.

still be yearning for a continuation of "the familiar," be it comprehensive

planning or dealing in RFPs to obtain CDBG resources as in past.

In that

case their actions in denying both the realities and the new possibilities
are part of the problem, wasting everyone's time and resources.

As understanding of the underlying forces shaping neighborhood dynamics

increases, urban recovery becomes attainable with considerably less

additional public assistance.

Local interests will become more resourceful.

Imaginative new approaches will open up

—

even to handle the more difficult

challenges like displacement, condominium conversions, and demands for
controls on rents.

The true revitalization of Boston's neighborhoods will become evident
when tenants fix a leaky hot water faucet rather than idly cursing the
landlord.

This little but important act toward improving their housing is

but the first step on the road to recovery, as they soon come to feel more

self-reliant and less antagonistic.

The tenant household that stays, buys,

and adds a room rather than moving out soon helps build a sense of
community.

Many such convergent changes can begin to mend local housing

systems more effectively than doubling all the past public money and

providing it again today.
Planning, conducted from City Hall, seems still too preoccupied with

instead of going into the neighborhoods to "listen"

responding to crises,
to the residents.

If we now put one tenth the time, talent, and resources

into understanding market dynamics that are spent responding to crises, our

powerless feelings about housing and then the housing itself will improve.
For too long, it seems, the drone of federal policy machinery lulled
and obscured much already happening "by itself" in countless neighborhoods.

Recently, this federal engine produced more noise than power, promising but
not really taking people where they want to go. Now the federal engine seems

suddenly shut down.

After the initial panic, communities are finding they

are on their own, in small sailboats, with only limited auxiliary power.

With a better knowledge of weather, wind, and tides, they can still get
where they choose; but now they must understand what is possible and decide
their own destinations.

enjoyable.

Who knows, getting there may even become more

.

-
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ABOUT RENTAL HOUSING

The influence of rental economics and housing market dynamics are
important to understand before adopting new regulatory measures like rent
controls.

The Question of Fair Market Rents

The U.S. Census revealed that $200 to $250 was a common monthly rent in

Boston in 1980, but this is very misleading, based on out-of-date financing
and undermaintenance.

Many rental properties are owned outright, without

any financing; "friendship rents" to long terra residents are still very

common
To maintain their stock properly today, many owners would need to

receive at least $100 more monthly rent per unit; and if title turnover or

refinancing is involved, breakeven rents turn out to be as much as $400 to
$500 per month.

Inflation has doubled the cost of providing decent rental

housing, along with everything else.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, urban housing was out of fashion
everywhere, in San Francisco as in Boston, while the nation, pre-occupied
with suburban child-rearing, overbuilt its housing stock.

Because of slack

urban demand, rents in general ended up below the break-even point.

Disinvestment set in and much stock began to slide towards abandonment.
In Boston, as elsewhere, suburban over-development was an underlying

cause of such urban ills as abandonment and arson.

The media obscured and

polarized this situation by focusing on frustrated residents railing at

ineffective local officials, reports of redlining by banks, and identifying
slumlords and unscrupulous real estate practices.

Suburban overbuilding

caused many urban problems like racial steering and redlining by brokers,

insurers and lenders.

Addressing these in isolation could not cure the

housing disinvestment actually caused by regional supply/demand mismatches.

Rents remained inadequate because tenants could always move on to the
next hand-me-down.

Housing standards could have been enforced if regional

growth had been less during the 1970s.

Proper maintenance would have cost

only another $30-40 a month back then, and much more stock would have been

maintained and thereby saved.
Federal incentives for subsidized development made matters worse.
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Federal programs provided deep subsidies that guaranteed an extra $200 and
more per month to developers of showcase projects in deteriorating areas,
instead of providing broad, shallow assistance to address the $40 income/

expense gap in existing housing.

These developments further siphoned

off demand for existing rentals in the community and distorted resident

expectations in these neighborhoods even more.

•

Boston's median contract rent of $191 in 1980, therefore, is the
product of outdated financing or outright ownership and a disinvestment

psychology still shared by too many lenders, owners and tenants.

In today's

dollars, $250 monthly would provide a break-even rent for stock so owned and

still in adequate repair, and perhaps $350 would induce the necessary

upgrading by existing owners to make up for deferred maintenance.

Title

turnover and refinancing at prevailing interest rates adds another

$J.OO

This only introduces

monthly to rents without any visible improvements.

current capital costs and still limits the owners' returns on equity to
levels that seemed inadequate years ago.

Sales and refinancing were postponed for years in the hopes that
finance costs would return to prior levels, but current owners will not own
and defer repairs forever.

Figure A shows these relationships for the

"same" unit:
Various Illustrative Rents for the "Same" Unit
"Disinvestment*

Break-even

Deferred

"Centnfi cation

Upgrading

Maintenance

Under current ownership
After turnover*

• If turnover

$200/ mo

$250/ mo

$350/ mo

300/ mo

375/ mo

500/ mo

not obtainable, disinvestment accelerates.

Source; Prepared by

EL

Coetze from housing interviews

in the

Boston area.

Federal homeowner tax deductions compound the problem by limiting

obtainable rents.

Most households that can afford $450 monthly are already

in a tax bracket that makes resident ownership much more advantageous.

($417 per month is one-quarter of a $20,000 annual income.)
If rents cannot be raised to these levels,

then the owner's net income

drops so low that the structure would be worth less than two years' gross
rents at current capitalization rates.

Under such a foreshortened economic

time horizon, few rational owners undertake improvements; rather,

they allow

-
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the property to run down and even stop paying local taxes to salvage what they

can

—

ending up among the one in seven properties in Tax Title.

Much of Boston's rental housing thus seems trapped in a dilemma that
rent controls would only exacerbate.

Roughly a doubling of rents

would be

needed to recondition the dwellings without subsidies and to compensate for
the effects of inflation.

The majority of present tenant households,

however, would find such rent increases intolerable.

Too Manv Interests Are Now in Conflict

More and more actors in increasingly conflicting roles have come to be
involved in rental housing. Needless turnover is spurred by national tax
incentives, raising rents.

Differences that tenant and landlord used to

settle between themselves or were forced to live with now involve so many
interests, policies, boards, and procedures that actions are disjointed,

increasing mistrust and driving up costs.

To keep them down, interests must

work together.

Operating costs, for similar housing services, are much lower under
horaeownership because many responsibilities converge upon the homeowner,

encouraging him to address problems in a timely, efficient manner.

For a

homeowner to get back at himself, the way some tenants try to get back at
their landlord, would be absurd.

Tenant/landlord polarization causes available resources to be wasted.
In such situations, simple operating matters like fixing a leaky faucet,

bathroom drain, or gutter are often ignored until more serious damage has
occurred.

World-wide forces are driving everyone to greater self-reliance or to
doing without

—

and tenants cannot escape these raacroforces.

Just as

renting a car is an expensive convenience compared to owning, renting a
home is also becoming a luxury because operating costs are handled so

inefficiently.

Indeed, rentals were considered suited for those who could

not afford ownership due to an anomaly.

Like hand-me-downs in an era of

surplus, used housing could be obtained for just its operating costs.
Today, as scarcities loom and throwaways vanish, maintenance and acquisition

costs have reeraerged as an integral part of housing expenses that residents
raust

either pay (even if it requires doubling up) or that others must pay on

their behalf, be they private institutions, landlords, or the public.
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Landlords and the federal government now seem less inclined to continue
subsidizing tenants.
Existing rental housing then must become more efficient in its use of

available resources.

This includes retaining the lower interest financing

many current owners still hold, and using the available rental incomes more
effectively, instead of looking for additional new subsidies and tax
gimmicks.

Maintaining affordable rental housing requires retaining the

existing owner and his financing, not antagonizing and replacing him.

Reviving Housing Demand is the Key to Improving Housing

Recently, as construction throughout the Boston region has slowed,

various Boston neighborhoods have begun to attract new households formed
from the "baby boom generation." For years many, residents simply moved to

another hand-me-down.

—

by someone else

condominiums.

Now, the property has frequently already been bought

as an investment, either to reside in or to convert to

Stock that may no longer be profitably fixed up and rented to

current residents has often become attractive, as condominiums, to more

affluent owners.

Neighborhood market climate is the primary determinant of the future of
the housing stock in any given location.

The many different types of

owners, residential households, and stock types,

as well as wide range of

motives for owning, buying and selling residential properties are
bewildering.
of owners.

However,

market climates tend to sort out the various types

The shrewdest and most sophisticated operate in rising markets,

whereas in weak markets, where demand is inadequate to maintain the supply,

ownership tends to have passed to the inexperienced and unsophisticated.

Appropriate housing policies must consider the crucial differences
between well-functioning and problem markets.
Only stable markets encourage sound maintenance. Stock located in such
areas, where demand balances supply, tends toward more steady and predict-

able appreciation.

Owners rent to tenants who rarely cause problems, pay

their rents regularly and impose only normal wear and tear.

If not already

adequately insulated, the owner weatherizes in order to hold down heating
costs and obtain better rents.

In Boston, during the 1960s and early 1970s,

such stability was confined to enclaves such as Ashmont Hill, Melville Park,

Savin Hill, and parts of Jamaica Plain, South Boston and elsewhere.

-

Declining markets

,
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where supply exceeded demand throughout much of the

1970s, experienced much deterioration, disinvestment, 3nd abandonment.

Even

though lack of adequate income often induced tenants to "skip out" after

falling several months behind in rent payments, owners often continued to
rent to such households instead of leaving their properties vacant and

vulnerable to vandalism.

This downward spiral was further encouraged by

Legal Aid's advocacy of tenants' rights against "slumlords."

Tenant-oriented fuel assistance, like oil refills for empty tanks and
the moratorium on winter gas shutoffs, further encouraged residents to seek

ways to avoid meeting their full housing costs.

Most owners of such

marginal properties actually lack the resources, managerial skills, and
motivation to properly maintain and weatherize their properties.
Lack of income to invest or live elsewhere often brought owners and
tenants together in declining neighborhoods. Now, a legacy of unresolved

problems prevents these areas from rallying as the market climate improves.
A substantial 'amount of deferred maintenance remains, for which the

community possesses neither the skills nor adequate resources.

Motivation is also lacking because the residents tend to focus on
unresolved problems instead of the emerging opportunities.

Now however,

growing urban demand provides grounds for renewed neighborhood confidence in
the future.

Along with the newcomers, some well-targetted assistance

directed at visible blight can boot-strap these neighborhoods.

As results

become visible, residents will discover new roles they can play in boosting

neighborhood pride and restoring the community.
Rising markets can be identified through the new ownership types that
enter to take advantage of demand exceeding supply

and outright speculators.

—

traders, investors,

The South End and Charlestown are already classic

cases, but many sections of the city, from parts of Allston-Brighton and

Jamaica Plain to many neighborhoods in Dorchester and East Boston, have been
affected.

Conversion of multifamily properties to condominiums for sale to
newcomers in higher tax brackets is one sure sign.

Here, the tide of rising

demand can be harnessed directly to recondition the properties, but

financing at current interest rates will quickly inflate rents as previously
mentioned.

Enabling prior residents, particularly tenants, to share in the

benefits of renewed neighborhood vitality is possible; one solution is to
keep local markets from becoming too strong.
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The slumlord greedily pocketing rents is mostly a convenient media

More detailed research, examining case histories and current income/

myth.

expense statements of physically comparable properties, not surprisingly,

confirms that in weak markets housing properties generally perform poorly as
investments.

Too often, these properties have ended up in the hands of

unsophisticated owners before falling among the one out of seven in Tax
Title.

Or they are available "for a song" to those more aware how soon the

market may rise.

According to general investment theory, higher risks usually accompany
higher returns.

In many of Boston's residential areas, however, this has

now become reversed.

The better real estate investments are accompanied by

much lower risks, a fact more apparent to newcomers than existing residents
and unsophisticated owners.

How Some Marginal Owners Survive

If we understood the survival techiques of those owners providing

decent rentals in marginal areas, then we could encourage more to follow.

These owners have managed to minimize their losses, as well as to produce
the utmost in housing services from the limited rent dollars available to
them.

Some owners are better able to control such factors as vacancies and
losses, as well as heating and financing costs, taxes and insurance,

according to a recent New Haven study of private rental housing.

Their net

income (return after expenses but before financing) can vary enormously.

Their property values, however, are even more influenced by changes in

neighborhood market climate.
An owner who can increase his net income by $240, only $12 per month,

improves his property value by some $1,000.
are easy to obtain

—

from new tenants.

In rising markets, such gains

In fact in strong markets,

rents

can jump by much, much more, but then much of this is absorbed by

refinancing.
On the other hand, the loss of just one month's rent, or $250,

radically alters "the bottom line" downward.

In weak neighborhoods, it

is difficult to decide which is worse: accepting a dubious tenant now to

avert vandalism or another month of vacancy.

Either way, the impact on

on rental income and property value can be devastating.
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Many owners of marginal properties are small time landlords making a

living the hard way and generally limited in their managerial abilities.

Sometimes tenants lacking other resources even take advantage of them.

Such

owners delay initiating eviction procedures until they have already lost
several months rent, and then often find the eviction delayed through many

more months of legal maneuvers because they failed to comply with all the

stipulations attending an eviction.
Heating costs are the major expense issue confronting rental properties
today.

In areas where tenants can ill afford to pay more rent, nothing

rewards landlords for investing in weatherization.

In these areas,

antiquated heating units, poor insulation and lack of storm windows have
inflated heating costs in smaller, frame stock tremendously, often to over
$1,200 annually per unit.

In these markets, owners cannot recover any major

outlays for weatherization through rent increases.

However, believing that

most tenants can obtain special fuel assistance, they transfer responsi-

bility for heat to their tenants.

Property damage, as well as wear and tear, also tends to be much
greater in troubled areas that seem invaded by many juveniles.

Even when

owners attempt repairs they quickly become discouraged by recurrent damage.

Sometimes this is even done deliberately by tenants to create grounds to
avoid rent payments.

Other owners feel powerless to prevent the over-

crowding that produces high wear and tear, resulting in more deterioration.

Insurance that is reasonably priced is also more difficult for owners
of marginal properties to obtain because of the higher risks.

Many have

been forced to purchase insurance through the Fair plan, which results in

higher premiums for less coverage.
High interest rates have already been discussed.

High financing costs

have discouraged sales because the necessary rent increases to cover them

were unobtainable, "locking in" the current owners.

The property tax burden in marginal areas was disproportionate, until
recently, and thus a significant contributor to blight.

Taxes unpaid for a

few years rapidly compounded to a total greater than the worth of the
property, causing some owners to simply walk away.

Property owners who encountered financial difficulties had no recourse;
sufficient rental income to improve matters, sell, or pay off tax

delinquencies was simply unavailable.

As a result, around 1,200 buildings

containing roughly 4,000 units are abandoned, and several times that number
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are in Tax Title.

Derelict 3-10 unit "eyesores," scattered throughout marginal areas now

discourage all the neighboring owners from investing any more.

Each day

they remain standing, empty and boarded up, they undermine the efforts of

any who might otherwise do something because, right or wrong, they are taken
as evidence that local demand is too weak to support the existing stock.

A great many owners of two or more unit properties have managed to

survive so far without public subsidies or assistance.
wary of such aid.

In fact, most are

Their success lies in obtaining steady rental income and

doing their utmost to control expenses.

Retaining reliable tenants, being

systematic about rent collection and clearer in their eviction procedures
has saved them from the fate of their fellow owners.

In the bulk of

the Fental inventory, these owners provide the best rentals, often at

"friendship rents."

Losing them and their goodwill would be a disaster for

tenants.

Across-the-board rent controls would prove very harmful to these
precarious rental situations.

These owners already consider measures like

the Fair Housing Ordinance a further threat to their ability to survive.

They yearn instead for more effective programs to recondition or eliminate
the blighted structures dotting their neighborhood, even if direct

assistance to them is unavailable.
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Inter«t 1n differentiating neighborhoods
for treatment has grown in recent years,
but debates about bank redlining have made
planners reluctant to classify neighborhoods
explicitly. Nevertheless, with diminishing
resources, planning now requires a closer
understanding of how and why neighborhoods
change, in order to devise more appropriate
interventions.
Effective neighborhood planning involves
matching local housing supply and demand by
tailoring interventions to particular
market dynamics.* Where there is too much
supply, disinvestment, abandonment, and
even arson continue, as ebbing confidence
prevents the investment of sufficient capital
and effort to maintain the housing. On the
other hand, where demand exceeds available
supply, speculation, gentrifi cation and
soaring costs take over, often forcing out
prior residents.
Planners can play a key role in keeping
markets on middle course
and this article
is intended to help them find that new course.
Despite a few proverbial Newarks or San
Frandscos where market mismatches are too
extreme, in most neighborhoods of most cities,
planners can coutervail, by influencing
local markets at the margins.

—

A new planning/policy approach calls for a
land use information system (LUISystem),
differentiating neighborhood dynamics and
attuned to reflect year-by-year chanqes.
Conceptually, this land use information
system is developed on three levels:
(1)
a census block-type Information system for
background; (2) an extensive, citywide
parcel -based system for monitoring shifts
in neighborhood dynamics, and (3) an
Intensive monitoring of some five to ten
microstudy areas typifying various market

Rescuing the American Dream (New
York: Holmes I Meier, 1983) details
this new approach.
Its elements
are identified in Rolf Goetze and
Kent W. Col ton, "The Dynamics of
Neighborhoods," Journal of the Ameri
can Planning Association 46 (April
1980), 184-194.

-

dynamics to detect the causes of changes
in specific submarkets.
This requires a
well -integrated, three-tiered local
information system.
The U.S. Census Background System
1980 census data are now becoming available,
but they are only very rudimentary because
Information is aggregated, presented through
cross-tabulations, and gathered only every
ten years.
Change can thus not be analyzed
in detail.
The time interval 1s also too
long to detect the most significant changes
at the neighborhood level, such as shifts
from disinvestment to reinvestment, changes
in the rate of turnover, and the resurgence
of resident ownership after many years of
decline.

Nevertheless, census data can provide both
a valuable backdrop as well as fresh
reference points for measuring future
changes in such factors as population, race,
household size, and Income on the demand
side, and dwelling counts and sizes, rents
values, vacancy rates, and turnover on the
supply side.
At this background level, the emphasis
should be placed on contrasting neighborhood
dynamics over the 1970-1980 interval. Rents,
values, household size, dwellinq counts and
vacancies should be examined. Chanqes over
time in rank, or 1n deviations from the
dtywide norm, are very informative.
An Extensive, Parcel -Based System for
Mon i tori nq Change

One comprehensive system should be constructed
to integrate available exlstlnq information,
by parcel, focused on monitoring housing
patterns and neighborhood chanqe.
The best
Judgment of which data to integrate into this
dtywide system develops from the Intensive
monitorlnq of five to ten study areas
(discussed below).
Jurisdictions should
consider the following factors in creating a
LUISystem.
In addition to assessments, municipal
assessing departments often have computerized
sales and title records by parcel.
If
available, structural fire data and housingrelevant police statistics should be included,
along with engineering or building
department data on housing improvements.

additions, and demolitions.
Son* States,
llki Connecticut, »111 arovue Jiti on jll
real estltt transactions for I modest fe*.
and often l private corporation como'ltS
transfers, ind mortgage Jati by parcel
•ii «».

Microcomputers can now help local planners create a LUlSystem
for under $10,000 in hardware/software costs.
The Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy has created a "generic" software system, originally
for assessors, called SOUR (Small On-line Research), which enables
planners to interact directly with their data and explore hidden
patterns.

for only « few dollars per parcel, the
Sanborn n»p Conwany of Pelham NT will
field survey entire dty sections, develop
a master address list, and reliably code the
land use, condition, and vacancy status of
This Is very useful to
eacn property.
cities no longer sure what 1s currently
Periodic updates ay Sanborn
"out there."
trt then aoth Inexpensive and valuable for
monitoring further changes.

After deciding which factors can readily be
obtained on each parcel, sucn data should
be geoceded and electronically stored and
available for console terminal displays
Citywide norms for
and special studies.
value*, turnover rates, appreciation,
sales-assessment ratios, and so forth
should be generated to guide neighborhood
Fran this LUlSystem. thr«e
analysis.
mwjediately useful products should be
developed:

A monitoring of assessment/sales
ratTb trends to detect inequities,
changes, and contrasts. Local real
estate taxes are a significant
burden on property owners, and
differential impact can strongly
influence individual decisions to
maintain, disinvest, or reinvest.

3eyond these, several more factors should
be integrated into the parcel -based system,
if the microarea studies confirm their
usefulness. Annual data on residents'
moves, occupations, and household sizes
are especially helpful for predicting
future trends.
In many cities such data
are still gathered, even though R. L.
Polk's service was recently discontinued.
3y electronically comparing current
households with past residents, "who has
come* with "who left," sensitive
interpretation can reveal changes in a
timely way.
Also, by comparing such
resident data with sales or title records,
shifts toward absentee ownership
(heralding disinvestment) become aoparent
early enough to intervene effectively.
Property tax delinquency. Hens, fires,
and recorded home loan credit (often
available from the state bank commission)
should also be considered for the
LUlSystem, because they reflect the
changes actually occurring.

•

SOLIR enables the planner to store up to 120 different
characteristics ("factors") describing a single record (parcel,
block, ward, etc.) for up to 1500 separate records on a single
compact diskette (or 30,000 such records on one hard disk).
can be entered manually or accepted electronically from
other computer systems.

• These

data can then be sorted, copied, indexed, displayed,
and analyzed in many- useful ways, limited mainly by the
planner's imagination.

New Haven and Cleveland are lead cities employing SOLIR in land
planning, policy analysis, and management applications involving
public, private, and community interests. Acquiring the software
involves attending a one week, hands-on course or two offered by the
Lincoln Institute, and thereby qualifying as a master user.

suitable for at-a-glance review on
CRT monitors.
Property should be
callable to show such data as
structure type, number of units,
condition, vacancy status, tenure
type, assessed value, and last
laartet sale date and value.
Too
men Information clutter is as
harmful as Incomplete or erroneous
data, so care must be taken to
assemble a useful base.
If the
data cannot be readily retrieved.
Manipulated, and up-dated, the
system is worse than useless.

monitor value cnanges over time of
all properties sold more than once.
This is much more useful for
monitoring raicrodynamics than
In
changes in areawide averages.
some areas and for certain house
will
be
types, appreciation
substantial; for others 1t will be
low as particular property types
or areas come into or go out of
favor.
Such differences are
important for creating tailored
policies.

SOLIR 1s an extensive software package helping planners
and policy makers quickly and easily store, manipulate and
display large amounts of land related Information on Radio
Shack microcomputers.

• Oata

A simple base file of pertinent
data related to eacn parcel

A paired sales analysis to

•

Those interested in obtaining the software should contact
Maclver, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1000
(617) 661-1152
Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 32138.

• Mathew

Jurisdictions Interested in creating their own LUlSystem should
Rolf Goetze, 129 Leonard Street, Belmont MA 02178.
(617) 489-2739

• contact

Intensive Monitoring of Five to Ten Case
Study Microareas

"Neighborhood listening" is an approach
recently pioneered in some dtles like
Boston and New Haven.
It commences with
gathering both objective and subjective
data in half a dozen different areas,
sampling the range from strong to weak
markets. Representative areas, each
containing some two hundred structures,
are both manageable and informative.
Sound local policies arise out of wellgrounded understanding of what 1s now
actually taking place 1n these submarkets.
Without It, officials frequently make
erroneous judgments, such as treating a
neighborhood on the verge of rediscovery
as if disinvestment were still the key
problem, or assuming that a few lowinterest home improvement loans in a weak
area are an effective stopgap until more
(This
assistance becomes available.
further stigmatizes the area and usually
discourages even ordinary maintenance,
because non- recipients wait for ever
more aid.)

To fully understand the dynamics in
changing neighborhoods, these study areas
must be closely monitored through both
statistical and interview techniques, to
detect subtle shifts in motivation on
the part of residents, potential and
actual buyers, sellers, tenants, investors,
brokers, and lenders.
If residents had
more money, would they stay and upgrade,
or move out? Comparative economic data on
housing costs and appreciation provide
Contrasts between areas
useful insights.
and changes over time are both important
to analyze.
Regularly hearing from real estate brokers,
community leaders, and loan officers is
a poor substitute for this, because "folk
wisdom" and misinformation are so easily
Planners should do the research
passed on.
to substantiate whether people are actually
investing or disinvesting, and determine
why.

To detect patterns in these microcases,
the data can be recorded on index cards
and basemaps, but interactive microcomputers are becoming useful to handle
such analyses (see box).
Once the
appropriate and consistent early
precursors of change are identified,
however, they should be factored into the

computerized extensive, dtywide
monitoring system. For example,
neighborhood listening may suggest that
certain tenure shifts or the entry of
particular occupations herald change.
Counting mail boxes may reveal that new
demand is producing illegal conversions.
Monitoring such data on each parcel on a
citywide basis would then prove useful in
tracking divergent market dynamics.
Since these microcase studies identify
the most appropriate data for
incorporation into the LUlSystem, they
should commence as soon as possible,
before the system has become fixed and
firm.
As microcomputers advance and the cost
of data retrieval declines, as laser

disc technologies promise easier storage
and access to old data records and
photographs, municipalities will discover
that the benefits of creating an
integrated local information system far
outweigh the costs.
Such monitoring of "hard" and "soft"
data is best coordinated by a single
experienced person, involved in all
policy discussions relevant to community
development and housing revitalization.
Responsibility should not be diffused
among many individuals, because
understanding arises from a careful
synthesis of many contradictory
The goal is to reach beyond
impressions.
conventional wisdom, to learn what
actually shapes maintenance and market
behavior.
Past policies often created unrealistic
citizen exoectations that are now part of
Armed with better
the problem.
understanding, planners can lead the way,
and become part of the solution.

